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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

10151

November 2, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S *+*

FROM: INR - Roger Hilsman *Por*

SUBJECT: The Situation in the Light of the Mikoyan
Talks and Castro Speech
(Released to White House)

1. Castro has apparently accommodated himself (no other choice being open to him) to (1) the dismantling of the Soviet missiles and the removal of IL-28s and (2) the Red Cross inspection of incoming Soviet ships at sea to verify that no arms are being carried.
2. Castro has not agreed to any form of foreign verification of the dismantling process on Cuban soil and though unable to stop it he continues his objection to aerial surveillance. Moscow refuses to guarantee the safety of the planes.
3. The Soviets are making a determined effort to renegotiate the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement by embodying in it Castro's five points and making Castro a party to the negotiation. Mikoyan gave no assurance that, even if this were done, Castro would agree to verification activities on Cuban soil, but presumably the Soviets are trying to suggest that US concessions on the five points might get us something on verification.
4. This Soviet position does not appear to be final. That is, Mikoyan may well try in his talks with Castro to get him to accept some form of limited verification (limited verification is also very much in the Soviet interest), in return for new dosages of Soviet economic support, continued maintenance of defensive weapons systems, and assurances that the US will be pressed to give something on the five points.
5. Meanwhile, the Soviet missile sites are being dismantled and low-level aerial surveillance provides our only present means of determining what is happening to

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the dismantled equipment. Our level of assurance on this matter is not as high as it should be, and we must consider seriously whether at least additional forms of air surveillance providing greater search capability and continuity should be instituted immediately.

Obtaining Agreement on Verification

6. The next problem is what pressure toward satisfactory verification procedure would be effective if Mikoyan fails in getting Castro's agreement to it (or if Mikoyan chooses not to exert great pressure to this end). Inducing the Soviets to push Castro in the direction of agreement remains the most promising course open.

7. The greatest incentive for the Soviets to mount pressure on Castro is the prospect, or presence, of new US pressure on the Soviets. This can be conveyed by (1) maintaining our military readiness, and (2) holding up on relinquishing our quarantine to the Red Cross and threatening to include tankers in the proscribed list, (3) making clear that we will regard failure to obtain adequate assurance that the missiles and IL-28s are leaving as tantamount to failure to remove them, (4) stepped up aerial surveillance can also contribute to the US posture of mounting pressure not only on the USSR but on Castro as well.

8. These US actions, in addition to confronting the USSR with the continuing possibility of a direct clash with the US, would also have the maximum implications for Castro. He would face the prospect of continuing economic deterioration in a crisis atmosphere with the further prospect that our assurances against invasion could become invalid. Under such circumstances the problems of the regime would include maintenance of political coherence and stability in the face of US-induced Soviet pressure and whether a meaningful relationship with the USSR could be maintained in the aftermath of the crisis.

Conclusion

9. We conclude that whether Castro is independently balking at verification, or whether he is doing so with Soviet connivance, pressure must continue to be put on Castro via Moscow. Castro must be made to think -- through Moscow -- that he confronts the threat of extinction in war, or at a minimum of complete isolation including a cessation of meaningful Soviet support. Moscow must also be made to realize that Castro's failure to grant the verification

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which we deem adequate, could lead to the vitiation of the entire Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement and all the consequences this entails. We believe that only if these two messages can be got across, is there a good chance that the Soviets will do the necessary arm-twisting in Havana.

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